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Abstract
The article analyses the evolution of European diplomacy over two decades, to assess the 
impact of the EEAS creation alongside consecutive waves of enlargement. Data is drawn 
from two original datasets about EU member states’ diplomatic representations within the EU 
and across the globe. It shows that member states have maintained and strengthened their 
substantial diplomatic footprint across the EU’s territory, expanding it to include new 
members and making Brussels a diplomatic hub also for non-member countries. In parallel, 
and despite the establishment of the EEAS, member states have maintained and even 
increased their networks of diplomatic representations across the globe, alongside more 
numerous and more politically active EU Delegations. At the same time, member states have 
been reducing their diplomats’ numbers, as the cases of Austria, France, Germany and Italy 
show. This delicate balancing act has been made possible not only by contemporary 
technological developments, but also by European cooperation, as in the case of EUDs 
hosting member states’ representations in non-member countries, a development referred to 
as co-location. Therefore, whereas the continued presence of national embassies on the 
ground could be interpreted as detracting from the EEAS, the existence of EUDs contributes 
also to other, more indirect but certainly novel, forms of diplomatic cooperation under a 
single European roof.
1. Introduction
This article analyses the evolution of European diplomacy, and more particularly of the 
European Union’s (EU) and its member states’ networks of diplomatic representations during 
the last two decades, marked byprofound changes. The aim is to assess how member states 
have deployed their diplomats in a changing European and global context, by considering the 
reach and depth of their diplomatic networks, and their evolution across time, in comparison 
to the increasing diplomatic network of the EU.
The Treaty of Lisbon and the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
radically altered the set-up of the EU’s foreign affairs system, not only in Brussels but also 
beyond EU borders with the establishment of EU Delegations (EUDs). This has occurred as 
the EU nearly doubled its membership, with the 2004, 2007 and 2013 enlargements. These 
developments have been analysed from a number of perspectives, ranging from EU foreign 
affairs more generally (see for instance Costa, 2019; Missiroli, 2010; Smith, 2013) to the EEAS 
(Balfour et al, 2015; Smith et al., 2016) to specific examples of diplomatic cooperation on the 
ground in third countries (Baltag and Smith, 2015; Bicchi and Maurer, 2018; Maurer and Raik, 
2018). Much less has been written on the evolution of EU member states’ diplomatic networks 
in parallel to and because of the EU’s enlargement and to the set-up of the EEAS and EUDs. 
While the analytical focus in the literature has tended to privilege an EU-centric approach, this 
article aims to complement this with an analysis of how member states’ national diplomacies 
have changed alongside the EU, both within the EU territory and across the globe. To what 
extent (and in what ways) have changes within the EU foreign policy structure been reflected 
in changes to member states’ national diplomatic networks, across Europe and beyond? How 

































































has European diplomacy as a whole evolved over the last twenty years and what does that 
suggest in relation to future developments?
The purpose here is to trace the evolution of European diplomatic networks within the EU and 
beyond the EU borders, in order to show how the macro-picture has changed during two 
decades of turbulent times. The article focuses on data generation and exploratory analysis, 
rather than hypotheses confirmation. Identifying specific causal mechanisms will be the next 
step and requires in-depth interviewing and further qualitative and quantitative analysis. 
Rather, the aim here is to identify the main quantitative dimension of European diplomatic 
networks, namely the number of European representations (member states’ embassies and EU 
Delegations) and assess its variation across time, while proposing a number of plausible 
explanations. To that effect, we examine diplomats’ numbers and budget for four countries 
(Austria, France, Germany and Italy). We thus aim to build on similar analyses of the past 
(Balfour, Carta, Raik 2015; Manners and Whitman, 2000) and to systematise the data on which 
they relied. Once set alongside the academic debate and the establishment of the EEAS, the 
evolution in these figures shows a number of important patterns for current debates about the 
future of diplomacy, the EU and international politics more generally, as we are going to 
explore.
In this article, we define a diplomatic network as the set of diplomatic representations 
maintained by a member state or by the EU across the globe.1 The data presented here pertains 
to bilateral relations only, between each actor and the hosting country,2 and comes from two 
original datasets on diplomatic representations of EU current and perspective member states, 
as well as of the EC/EU. The first dataset includes data on diplomatic representations within 
the EU territory from the Diplometrics Diplomatic Representation dataset and updated using 
Europa World Factbook data. It focuses on representation within the EU, outlining diplomatic 
networks for 2001, 2009 and 2018.3 The second dataset is devoted to representation outside 
the EU and uses data derived from EEAS documents, supplemented with data from the 
Diplometrics Diplomatic Representation dataset and Europa World Factbook data. While the 
main data source excludes countries not recognized by all EU member states, it has the 
advantage of presenting official data, collected on a 6-monthly basis over the period 2001-
2018, which differs from alternative datasets on diplomatic representation.4 As data on each 
member state is only available from the accession date, it is complemented by the two other 
sources for pre-accession data. The two datasets were not merged, as the variety of sources 
would make comparison between representations inside and beyond EU borders less reliable. 
The primary goal of this article is thus to show the evolution across time and given changes to 
the EU’s set-up within the two datasets of European diplomatic networks, as well as to compare 
the evolution of diplomatic representations within the EU and outside its borders. To put it 
differently, we track two political phenomena, through the use of two original datasets: 1) 
diplomatic representation of both member states and non-member states inside the EU; 2) 
diplomatic representation of member states and the EU outside the EU.
1 For the EU, this means the network of the European Commission Representative Offices, later upgraded to 
EUDs after the Lisbon Treaty came into effect.
2 We are not taking into account representations to multilateral organisations.
3 The data is structured in such a way that considers an EU of 28 member states for all time periods under 
consideration here. The formal change to an EU27 through Brexit is not taken into account.
4 Alternative yet incomplete datasets are for instance the Diplomatic Exchange Data set, from the Correlates of 
War Project (including its unofficial updates) (Bayer, 2006), or more recently the Lowy Global Diplomacy 
Index (Lowy Institute, 2019).

































































Three main trends emerge from the evidence presented. First, the period of the ‘big bang’ 
enlargement of 2004, which brought ten new member states to the EU, engendered a wave of 
new diplomatic representations within Europe with the goal of weaving together the new 
diplomatic shape of the continent. This new set of embassies scattered across Europe partially 
fizzled out in the following decade, but member states continue to maintain a significant 
diplomatic focus within the EU’s territory, where most of their overall diplomatic footprint is 
located. Second, the creation of the EEAS and of EUDs across the globe has not reduced 
individual member states’ diplomatic representations beyond the EU’s borders. Contrary to 
expectations, the Europeans’ diplomatic network has marginally but surely expanded over the 
last two decades, even while the network of EUDs was consolidating. Third, this expansion 
has been supported by contrasting trends in member states’ human resources. The number of 
member states’ diplomats seem to be declining, as a more in-depth analysis of Austria, France, 
Germany and Italy shows. The increasingly thin distribution of diplomats supports member 
states’ global reach thanks not only to technological means, but also creative – and once again 
EU-centred – solutions such as co-locations, in which EUDs host member states’ diplomatic 
representations. 
These trends add to the existing literature in a number of ways. They confirm the argument that 
established relations between EU member states differ from diplomatic contacts with non-EU 
countries. Diplomacy of EU members and by EU members is a key component in the EU 
framework, and Brussels is a diplomatic hub. There are gains to be found at the margins, 
however, where member states hav  discovered that cooperation can thrive even without 
diplomatic contacts in capitals. Beyond EU borders, the EU’s effort at creating a diplomatic 
network of its own through EUDs has not limited the territorial ambitions of member states. 
‘Being there’ remains a key quality of contemporary diplomacy, even when it is down to a 
single person per diplomatic representation. Territory maintains a continuing and in fact 
increasing importance in member states’ diplomatic considerations, even at a time of budget 
cuts, information abundance and increased technological means. As we are going to see, 
however, the existence of EUDs has engendered new forms of cooperation that have 
contributed to sustain a reduction in diplomats’ (not embassies’) numbers.
The article is organised as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview of the literature 
on the evolution of diplomacy, and European diplomacy in particular. The third section focuses 
on the Europeans’ diplomatic network within EU borders, including third country 
representation to the EU. In the fourth section, we analyse European diplomatic networks 
beyond EU borders, across time and in relation to the establishment of the EEAS. In the final 
section, we analyse the human resources underpinning member states’ global reach, by 
focusing on personnel numbers and budget for four ministries of Foreign Affairs, as well as 
the existing co-locations of EUDs and national representations in non-EU countries.
2. European diplomacy: the scholarly state of the art
The literature on diplomacy, and European diplomacy in particular, is undergoing a revival, 
but scholarly arguments seem to suggest contradictory developments. Analyses of diplomacy 
– a fashionable research topic again, largely due to the ‘practice turn’ in International Relations 
– seems at odds with globalisation studies, which suggest that virtual means of communication 
are detracting from the relevance of territorial reach and physical presence. For their part, 
institutional analyses have highlighted the changing nature of the EU foreign policy system in 
response to the Europeanisation (and ‘Brusselisation’) of foreign policy and the creation of the 
EEAS, on average suggesting a deepening of member states’ reliance on cooperation within 
the EU. Therefore, there are contrasting arguments about how member states’ diplomatic 

































































networks should evolve, in a context of expanded EU membership and strengthened EU 
diplomatic presence. 
The resurgent interest in diplomacy has been driven by scholars tracking its developments and 
describing specific historical examples (Berridge 2010; Black, 2010; Cooper et al., 2015; 
Cross, 2007, 2007; Goff, 2015; Hall, 2010; Murray et al., 2011, 2011; Sharp, 2011; Sofer, 
1988). This interest has received further impetus from the more recent ‘practice turn’ in 
International Relations, which has highlighted diplomacy’s theoretical contribution (Bicchi 
and Bremberg 201, (Neumann, 2016; Pouliot, 2016; Pouliot and Cornut, 2015). In fact, practice 
approaches have turned diplomacy into a flagship research topic onto which to showcase their 
original perspective. In particular, many scholars in the practice perspective have pointed to 
the crucial role of ‘frontline diplomacy’ (Cooper and Cornut, 2019) and to the need for 
diplomats to be on the ground in order to hone their skills (Kuus, 2015).
Globalisation studies, however, seem to challenge the role of territoriality, by implication 
suggesting that traditional embassies may go extinct. Drawing on arguments about the crisis of 
territoriality (e.g. Maier, 2000), this perspective points to the limitations of traditional 
embassies, citing financial constraints, advances in IT and communications, as well as 
vulnerability to irregular warfa e (c.f. Scott-Smith, 2017). Many scholars have also stressed the 
importance of digital changes for public diplomacy (Copeland, 2015; Cornut and Dale, 2019). 
This perspective points to a global trend towards an apparent reduction in the number of 
embassies, which can no longer compete with alternatives. Alex Oliver, who directs the 
Diplomatic Index at the Lowy Institute, for instance, argued that “embassies are now usually 
the slowest way to get information, unable to compete with lightning-fast media reporting and 
exhaustive country analyses prepared by NGOs and risk consultancies” (Oliver, 2016). 
Economic and financial constraints impose further limitations to the diplomatic machine, 
especially when alternatives exist to the expensive choice of maintaining an embassy.
There are thus conflicting expectations about the future of diplomatic representations on the 
ground, seen as a redundant expense from the perspective of globalisation, but also as an 
important site for tracing the direction of foreign policy from a practice perspective. These are 
not resolved in the literature on European diplomacy, which actually further complicates the 
picture with the creation of the EEAS.
Within European diplomacy, bilateral relations among member states are known to have a 
different quality from those between EU member states and third countries (Bátora and 
Hocking, 2009). This has been explained primarily with the degree of economic and political 
integration achieved through EU membership (Bátora, 2005), which has created a need for 
regular consultation and exchange, part of which occurs through traditional diplomatic means 
(Paschke, 2005). While foreign ministries and diplomats still have a role to play in bilateral 
ties between EU member states, this is often about facilitating ties between ministries or in 
Brussels, given the density of intra-EU relations and cooperation within the EU’s political 
system. The cross-boundary nature of some EU policies also creates the need for direct 
dialogue between member state authorities. Therefore, a core part of an EU member state’s 
diplomatic activity in other EU member states lies in coordinating and promoting a state’s 
positions within EU decision-making processes (Bátora and Hocking, 2009: 177–8). 
Diplomacy among EU member states thus has a slightly different quality to diplomacy beyond 

































































EU borders, not only justifying an emphasis on peaceful means,5 but also suggesting a different 
type of communication and involvement among participants.
In this vein, two views about the relevance of intra-EU diplomacy co-exist. On the one hand, 
the ‘domestication’ of intra-EU diplomacy, at least in the period prior to the Lisbon treaty, 
seems not to lead to a reduction of diplomatic resources (here in terms of staff deployed) in 
embassies within the EU (Bratberg, 2008). Rather, intra-EU embassies serve as hubs which 
can connect various national subject ministries with their relevant counterparts in another EU 
member state alongside other innovations in bilateral intra-EU diplomacy which circumvent 
embassies entirely (Uilenreef, 2014).
On the other hand, EU foreign affairs seem to have undergone a ‘Brusselisation’ (Allen, 1998), 
meaning that policy formulation, decision and implementation are increasingly conducted by 
officials based in Brussels. Especially in the 1990s and after, the physical and psychological 
locus of national decision-making in EU foreign policy seems to have shifted to Brussels-based 
intergovernmental institutions (Thomas and Tonra, 2012). Indeed, there is also a theoretical 
case to be made for a centralisation of EU diplomacy to occur (Austermann, 2014: 70–96). All 
of this would suggest a more limited relevance of diplomacy in EU member states’ capitals, 
given the amount of work conducted in Brussels.
Beyond EU borders, the creation of the EEAS, with the related upgrade of EUDs, has sparked 
a renewed interest in the way the EU is contributing to innovate on the age-old institution of 
diplomacy (Adler-Nissen, 2014; Bicchi, 2014; Bicchi and Maurer, 2018; Edwards, 2014; 
Hofius, 2016; Koops and Macaj, 2015; Spence and Bátora, 2015). The expectation across the 
literature has generally been that the EEAS and the EUDs were going to have a clear and 
significant impact on EU external relations, including on member states’ diplomatic networks. 
Not only “the existence of national embassies is seriously threatened in third countries where 
the EU has a genuine European approach”, but also the “network of ‘EU embassies’ is going 
to get more intense and diversified, dealing […] more and more with CFSP affairs” and thus 
challenging tasks traditionally undertaken by national embassies (Morisse-Schillbach, 2005: 
123). While some work has been done on charting the evolution of the networks of EUDs and 
the reasons underpinning this (Austermann, 2014; Duquet, 2018), limited research analyses 
how member states develop and integrate within the complex EU foreign policy system. The 
work in Balfour et al. (2015) stands as an exception and a recent continuation of the debate 
kicked-started by Manners and Whitman (2000). This perspective should instead be further 
developed, as member state foreign policy continues to be relevant despite radical changes in 
the EU’s diplomatic system (Hadfield et al., 2017).
Therefore, contrasting arguments exist about how member state diplomatic networks should 
evolve. While globalisation and European cooperation are expected to detract from the need to 
deploy diplomats abroad, European cooperation also requires diplomats, and not just in 
Brussels, to appreciate the local context, as suggested by practice approaches in IR. This article 
thus aims to take up the challenge set by these works in providing an empirical assessment at 
the macro level as to the actual evolution of European diplomatic networks over the last two 
decades. As the next sections demonstrate, the evidence collected suggests the continuing 
relevance of diplomatic representations for member states and the EU, especially within EU 
borders, but at the price of a thinning in the numbers of diplomats deployed.
5 Diplomacy has been defined for instance as “the peaceful conduct of relations amongst political entities, their 
principals and accredited agents” (Hamilton and Langhorne, 2011: 1) .

































































3. Diplomatic representation inside the EU
The first argument explored here through empirical evidence concerns the evolution of 
diplomatic representations within EU borders. As this section shows, we observe an 
intensification of the intra-European diplomatic network in parallel to the EU’s enlargement 
rounds, which is partially reversed after enlargement. In parallel, ‘Brusselisation’ of foreign 
policymaking appears to affect third countries seeking to interact diplomatically with the EU 
and its member states. 
Chart 1 provides an overview of representations of (original and post-2004) EU member states 
in other member states only, across time. It shows the high density of intra-EU representation 
of the EU’s member states, where even the EU’s smallest members such as Malta or 
Luxemburg maintain embassies in close to half of EU member states. At the same time, the 
EU’s larger member states are represented in every single EU member state.
Considering the evolution of this intra-EU representation over time further points to the 
distinctive nature of intra-EU diplomacy, as the EU’s Eastern enlargement rounds coincided 
with an across-the-board increase of intra-EU representation from a total of 603 in 2001 to a 
maximum of 699 in 2009. The increase of bilateral representation ahead of the EU’s 
enlargement rounds is indicative of countries’ desire to be directly informed about and be able 
to shape the EU enlargement process alongside. Of particular relevance here, both ‘old’ and 
soon-to-be EU member states increased the number of their representations in the other 
grouping. The desire for information and influence at the time of the EU’s enlargements thus 
went both ways.
The number of intra-EU embassies has remained relatively high. Nonetheless, it has declined 
from this peak to 661 in 2018. While large EU member states have refrained from reducing 
their intra-EU representation, the bulk of the reduction in intra-EU embassies was made by 
medium-sized ‘old’ EU member states. The number of representations of post-2004 member 
states instead is comparably more stable, with the even newer members Romania and Croatia 
(as well as the prior member Ireland) bucking the trends and minimally increasing their 
representation still.
These developments may indicate a partial move away from consultations through embassies 
in favour of more direct exchanges between ministries or officials based in Brussels, thereby 
confirming the trend towards increasing ‘Brusselisation’ (Juncos and Pomorska, 2011: 1100-
3). Cost-saving innovations such as establishing ‘roaming’ ambassadors responsible for 
multiple countries or embedding officials within other countries’ ministries may also account 
for some of the changes observed (Mattelaer 2019: 10). Overall, while the on-going robustness 
of intra-EU diplomatic ties initially observed by Bratberg (2008) is no longer a given, member 
states’ intra-EU diplomatic representation still remains very robust. Ultimately, bilateral 
representations in other member states complement Brussels-based processes, rather than 
entirely being replaced by them (Mattelaer 2019: 12).
‘Brusselisation’ arguably happens in relation to third countries too. Despite on-going debates 
as to the status of the EU in the international system (Duquet and Wouters, 2015), the EU is 
not only recognized by other actors as a regular participant by accepting EUDs to them, but 
also and more directly through third countries’ official diplomatic missions accredited to the 

































































EU. In 2018 there were 163 non-EU countries accredited with a mission to the EU6, of which 
159 had their seat in Brussels or its environs. These do not include other kinds of representative 
offices, of entities (such as regions) not recognized as sovereign countries or international 
organisations. 
In comparison to other world capitals,7 Brussels was one of the major hubs of global diplomacy 
in 2018 with 186 missions (159 official third country representations to the EU in Brussels + 
28 EU member state permanent representations), comparable to national capitals such as 
Washington, DC (177), but also exceeding Beijing (165), Tokyo (153), Delhi (149) and 
Moscow (147). When considering diplomatic representation to other EU member states, then 
only London (164), Berlin (160), or Paris (155) reach similar levels of local diplomatic 
representation, if we bracket Brussels as the parallel site for bilateral embassies to Belgium. 
Vienna (153) is in a similar position, as one of the several sites of the United Nations and other 
relevant international organisations. Lastly, Geneva (183) closely matches Brussels’ formal 
status given the presence of international organisations there. Outside of Europe only New 
York City (195) hosts a larger number of bilateral delegations, given that it serves as the main 
United Nations headquarters.
The ‘Brusselisation’ of third state representation to the EU is thus closely tied to the evolution 
of the EU and its foreign policy-making.8 While around at the time of the introduction of the 
Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 146 countries were already present in Brussels, this further 
increased to 180 at the time the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, to reach the current 186. The increasing 
foreign policy activity of the EU has thus not just favoured increased diplomatic contacts 
between EU member states, in Brussels and across the EU, but has also established Brussels 
as a key hub for diplomatic activity of third countries in Europe – and in the world more 
generally.
4. The European Diplomatic network outside the EU
Even though EU member states’ diplomatic networks are much less dense outside of Europe, 
there has been a small but consistent expansion of their diplomatic networks across the globe 
since 2009, contrary to expectations (see e.g. Balfour, Carta and Raik 2015, p.199). This is not 
a simple linear increase, however, as the networks’ specific location and reach has shifted in 
line with member states’ re-priorisation and re-direction of their diplomatic representations.
Chart 2 provides an overview of the evolution of the size of each EU member state’s diplomatic 
network (and that of the EEAS) over time, measured by the number of bilateral embassies in 
non-EU member states. Several observations emerge. First, the EU’s own network of EUDs 
has risen considerably over time from the original EC offices in 2001. By 2018, the EEAS 
diplomatic reach rivalled that of the member states with the largest bilateral diplomatic 
networks, France, German and the UK. Second, with a few notable exceptions, most member 
states have increased the size of their diplomatic networks. This rise is particularly pronounced 
in member states having joined since 2004, as well as the UK, Spain, and Luxembourg. Sweden 
is the country with the largest absolute increase of its diplomatic network, with 16 new 
embassies since 2009. Running counter to this trend, a handful of countries, namely the 
6 EU member states are forcibly represented in Brussels by sizeable permanent delegations.
7 Based on World Factbook data.
8 Though Brussels also serves as the host of NATO, the diplomatic representations of NATO member 
states and those enjoying formal ties with it tend to be organisationally and physically separate from 
missions to the EU.

































































Netherlands, Greece, Bulgaria and Denmark have instead reduced the size of their extra-EU 
diplomatic networks, to different degrees. Overall the total number of EU28 embassies outside 
of the EU has risen from 1,525 in 2009 to a total of 1,606 (excluding the EUDs) in 2018. The 
overall trend clearly defies the expectations that member states would delegate functions to 
EUDs, close representations outside the EU or rely uniquely on technological means.
While increases in the overall size of the diplomatic networks have been particularly 
pronounced for many member states joining the EU since 2004, others also made important 
adjustments to their diplomatic networks, some through lateral changes, by closing one 
embassy here and simultaneously opening another there. The data presented in Table 1 
provides indexed overviews of changes from 2009 to 2018 to member states’ diplomatic 
networks. The first index considers changes to the overall size of a member state’s diplomatic 
network by calculating the average proportion of annual changes for the observed time period 
(number of embassies opened/closed in relation to the total size of the diplomatic network in 
the previous year). So as to also capture the fact that some member states regularly close 
embassy to allow for the parallel opening of another, an averaged index of lateral volatility is 
also calculated (embassy closures/openings within the same year in relation to the total network 
size in the previous year). These indices are then added to make the total volatility of member 
state diplomatic networks comparable.
Size volatility Lateral volatility Total volatility Total 
network size 
(in 2018)
Luxembourg 10.71 1.43 12.14 15
Estonia 5.38 1.25 6.63 16
Cyprus 6.39 0.00 6.39 25
Sweden 2.84 1.86 4.69 75
Croatia 4.35 0.00 4.35 31
Slovakia 2.98 1.31 4.28 41
Hungary 3.24 0.55 3.79 62
Latvia 3.52 0.00 3.52 21
Malta 3.36 0.00 3.36 11
Czechia 2.80 0.47 3.27 64
Bulgaria 2.65 0.53 3.18 52
Denmark 1.56 1.38 2.94 48
Ireland 2.87 0.00 2.87 34
Poland 2.49 0.16 2.65 66
Lithuania 2.61 0.00 2.61 21
Finland 1.97 0.43 2.40 47
Spain 2.28 0.00 2.28 98
Portugal 2.01 0.20 2.28 53
Austria 1.10 0.73 1.83 57
Belgium 1.50 0.32 1.82 64
Netherlands 1.09 0.36 1.46 79
Italy 0.84 0.42 1.26 99
United Kingdom 1.04 0.08 1.12 123
EEAS 0.64 0.16 0.79 131
Germany 0.49 0.08 0.57 126
Romania 0.15 0 0.15 68

































































France 0.08 0 0.08 133
Table 1: Volatility of diplomatic networks between 2009 and 2018
Source: Calculation based on own dataset
Strikingly, most of the volatility in member states’ diplomatic networks is indeed due to 
changes to their overall size, rather than lateral moves of embassy openings and closures. 
Indeed, many member states have not undertaken any lateral changes whatsoever. In fact, it is 
not surprising that countries with an already large diplomatic network, such as France or 
Germany see less of a need to make any changes. These are rather made by many of the EU’s 
post-2004 member states, together with countries such as Luxembourg and Sweden. This is 
not a rule, though, as Romania hardly made any changes to its diplomatic network. Overall, 
the data suggests that the post-Lisbon period has indeed been a moment of adjustment for many 
member state diplomatic networks, leading to many increases in size and a few lateral moves.
The observed changes paint a picture of the Europeans’ collective diplomatic footprint across 
the globe in 2018 as outlined in Map 1. The map considers both member state embassies and 
EUDs collectively in third countries, testifying to Europe’s extensive diplomatic reach. While 
the number of EU member states’ embassies in any one third country varies significantly, 
overall there are only very few countries in which no European diplomatic presence exists. At 
the same time, there are very few capitals in which all 28 member states and EUDs are 
represented, namely Beijing, Moscow and Washington, DC. From a regional perspective, the 
Europeans’ diplomatic footprint is limited in Africa and, to an extent, in Latin America. Despite 
figuring more prominently in contemporary EU discourses and policy initiatives, African 
countries have not seen many European diplomats, partly also due to the difficult security 
situation on the ground in some of them.
This snapshot of the European diplomatic network is the result of the individual changes 
described above. Map 2 traces these changes in third countries and shows how those changes 
in the diplomatic networks of individual EU member states have altered the collective reach of 
EU diplomacy. In fact, it is possible to observe a clustering effect in certain places, with 
countries like Myanmar, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), India, Kazakhstan and 
Somalia being increasingly in the focus of EU diplomacy. Other centres of current or expected 
economic growth have also seen slight increases. As our dataset shows in the cases of 
Myanmar, UAE and Somalia member states have followed in the footsteps of the EUD 
establishing a presence there. Overall, most of these expansion patterns can either coincide 
with global economic trends—as expected by existing research (Smith, 2018)—or relevant 
political developments in the countries at hand.
Second, the overall increase in diplomatic representations has been accompanied by a moderate 
withdrawal from other parts of the world. Parts of the African continent stand out as areas from 
which member states have seemingly disinvested in diplomatic terms. Again, part of the reason 
lies in the politics (or rather, the conflicts) that characterise these places, such as Sudan or 
Yemen. Outside of Africa a decrease in the EU’s diplomatic representation can also be seen in 
Central America and Venezuela. This last case is one to be monitored further given the volatile 
economic and political situation in the country and the EU’s divided reaction to it (Schade, 
2019: 340–1). In fact, disinvesting from diplomacy on the ground is paralleled by an increase 
in diplomacy from capitals, when attempts at solving the crisis take place.
Overall, the data shows the global reach of European diplomacy outside the EU, a trend which 
is further expanding. Given the observed pattern of diplomatic representation following 

































































economic and political trends, diplomatic territorial reach appears to still be relevant, despite 
expectations to the contrary. This is in line with previous analyses of the evolution of European 
diplomatic networks (Rijks and Whitman, 2007: 36–7) but countering part of the globalisation 
studies. Moreover, extra-EU diplomatic representation of the EU and of its member states is in 
constant flux and likely to evolve further in line with global conflicts, economic developments 
and on-going European integration on diplomatic matters. What needs to be assessed is the 
shape of this continuing trend towards global representation, and what kind of commitment in 
terms of human resources it expresses. 
5. Expanding the diplomatic network, but cutting diplomats’ numbers
The observed constant and even expanding size of the diplomatic networks of the EU’s member 
states outside of the EU stands in contrast with the persistent average decline of diplomats’ 
numbers in EU foreign ministries. The phenomenon acquired further momentum in relation to 
the 2008 financial crisis, but is more ancient than that. This section examines the development 
of staffing trends in 4 EU countries, namely France, Italy, Austria and Germany9. The observed 
trends suggest that, with the partial exception of Germany, the Europeans’ global reach is 
occurring with limited staff in diplomatic representations. A very large number of embassies 
seems to rely on very few diplomats. This raises the question of how diplomatic services 
manage their countries globalist aspirations. The latter part of this section thus explores a by-
product of the EUDs creation, namely co-locations, which increasingly allow individual 
diplomats to go solo or semi-solo to the far corners of the globe.
France is a key example of this evolution, matching a reduction in diplomats’ numbers with an 
increase in other forms of employment and in (more volatile) budgetary means. Despite 
sporting one of the biggest diplomatic service in the world, France has cut the number of 
diplomats by 39% between 1980 and 2017 (Vaïsse, 2018: 41) although with intermittent 
variations in this overall trend (Morisse-Schillbach, 2005: 114). Almost half of reductions 
occurred over a ten-year period between 2007 and 2017 (Saint-Geours and Kessler, 2018: 280), 
thus starting before the 2008 financial crisis. Diplomatic officials with a permanent contract, 
in particular, decreased from 8,732 in 2007 to 5,759 a decade later. Reduction in diplomats’ 
numbers has been paralleled and partially offset by an ever-increasing use of locally-hired staff 
(Kessler and Charillon, 2018: 265–6).
Employment has stabilized at around 13,500 personnel overall in 2020. However, in line with 
a wider reform of public services in France, a further total cut by 5,7% is due by 2022, with 
roughly half of these cuts to occur this time abroad (Commission des Affaires Étrangères, 2019: 
7–8). Given that these cuts include not only a personnel, but also a monetary target, it is also 
likely that this will further translate in shifts from more expensive senior career diplomats to 
other types of employment (Saint-Geours and Kessler, 2018: 285). It is telling that this figure 
is below the 10% cut in staff envisioned by the reform of public administration, thanks to the 
recognition that the Foreign Ministry was already “at the bone,” as a former Secretary General 
commented in a parliamentary hearing in 2019 (Maurice Gourdault-Montagne in Commission 
des Affaires Étrangères, 2019: 31). The announcement of these further personnel cuts in 2018 
contrasted with the announcement of a significant increase of French development cooperation 
9 Given the difficulty of comparing staffing and budgetary figures across countries’, the observations here are 
not comparative in nature but consider developments within each country individually. The German foreign 
ministry has abstained from such comparisons for similar reasons (Bundesregierung, 2018: 6–7) Case selection 
is based on available data, the expansion of each country’s embassy network and the desire to consider the 
foreign ministries of large, medium and small EU member states.

































































funding, thereby underlining a shift away from traditional diplomatic resources towards what 
French president Emmanuel Macron has termed “agile diplomacy” (Semo, 2018).
Italy is another example of a drastic downward trend in foreign ministry employment figures 
accompanied by an increase in the budget. According to the ministry’s own data (MAECI, 
2015: 35, 2018: 35), staff with a permanent contract within its Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 
declined from 5,166 in 2005 to 3,789 in 2018. The country’s diplomatic corps has also 
decreased from 994 diplomats in 2005 to 977 in 2017. The latter figure masks, however, that 
this had reached a low of 909 diplomats in 2010. Like France, Italy is also showing a parallel 
increase in the budget with more money devoted to initiatives (development aid and initiatives 
for Africa in particular) and a contracting or stagnating budget for human resources and other 
expenses (MAECI, 2018: 28).
Austria follows a similar trend to the ones observed above.10 According to its Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (BMEIA, 2010: 243, 2019: 216), there has been a long-term decline in staffing. 
While in 1983 Austria employed 1,453 persons at the ministry (BMAA 1983: 220-21), in 2009 
there were 1,307 personnel employed across all categories and by 2018 this number had further 
declined to 1,125. This decline is even more pronounced for the positions held abroad. While 
in 2009 there were 751 such positions, by 2018 this had declined to 537. Accordingly, there 
has not been room-for-manoeuvre in terms of changes to Austria’s diplomatic network. The 
adaptations observed here ultimately represent specific choices of consecutive governments, 
with individual diplomats posted abroad taking on more and more responsibilities.11 At the 
same time, the Ministry’s budget, which includes Austrian development cooperation and 
certain social policies targeted at migrants to Austria, has also seen a gradual increase on 
average, with the additional money flowing largely into development cooperation and 
international initiatives (BMEIA, 2019: 218).
The German case is somewhat exceptional. At first, the country experienced an expansion in 
numbers, given the country’s reunification in 1990 and its increasingly global role. 
Reunification led to an increase in staffing of about 700 posts or 10% of existing staff, which 
counted 6,990 employees in 1990 (Regelsberger, 2005: 135). At the time, however, the 
government also committed itself to soon reduce the number of all public officials working for 
the federal government back to its pre-reunification figures, despite the country’s expansion in 
size. Between the years of 1996 and 2012 this required “the greatest effort” at the Foreign 
Ministry (Bundesregierung, 2018: 3), with an overall effect of shrinking staff numbers beyond 
target. In the mid-2000s, total employment reached lows of around 6,500 (Bundesregierung, 
2006: 4). In 2017 it stood at around 6,860, which was still below 1990 levels (Bundesregierung, 
2018: 9). Around 300 posts were slashed in representations abroad, compared to 1990. 
Since 2017, the tide has turned, with the ministry increasing the budgeted positions to around 
7,190 in the 2019 budget (Bundesregierung, 2019: 105) and the overall number of staff to 
11,836 in 2019 (Bartonek, 2020: 199). Nonetheless, budgetary shortages remain severe, with 
the ministry finding it increasingly difficult to react to temporary demands due to crisis 
situations and a 2019 internal review recommending a further important increase in the number 
of diplomatic positions (Brössler, 2019). This recommendation also needs to be seen in light 
of the country’s difficulty in hiring local staff compared to the UK or France given that German 
10 On the Austrian diplomatic service, see Sonnleitner (2018) and Maurer (2016).
11 Interview with a senior Austrian diplomat, Vienna, 29.8.2019.

































































is not a global language (Bundesregierung, 2018: 7–8).12 In addition, much like in the other 
cases observed, the personnel development are detached from the foreign ministry’s budget 
which has doubled in size between 2006 and 2018, mainly because of increased demand for 
peace and stability, as well as the so-called migration crisis (Brockmeier, 2018).
Therefore, Europeans’ diplomatic reach has been slowly but surely expanding, while staff 
numbers seem to be decreasing on average, posing an analytical puzzle. A number of factors 
concurs to explain this paradox. As the theoretical section has highlighted, technological 
advancements in communication and related changes to the gathering of information have 
justified a more reduced diplomatic footprint on the ground. The facilitation of information 
gathering and communication through new technologies has pushed the ‘dematerialisation’ of 
diplomacy (Commission des Affaires Étrangères, 2019: 13), with a direct reduction of the 
diplomats’ material presence.
Alongside this well-researched phenomenon, we would like to suggest that there are other 
factors too, directly related to the EEAS creation. While several countries compensate with a 
clever tweaking of human resources, such as the increased use of local staff for France and the 
UK (Kessler and Charillon, 2018: 266), the simultaneous accreditation to multiple countries 
(Rijks and Whitman, 2007: 38) or even, in the case of Germany, the sheer acceptance of 
constant understaffing (Brössler, 2019), there is also a European dimension to the persisting 
presence of bilateral diplomatic representations in non-EU countries, alongside EUDs. 
Firstly, as has been noted by other researchers, there is an increasing burden sharing between 
EU embassies on the ground (see for instance Baltag and Smith, 2015), with EU diplomats 
often able to act as key nodes of the Europeans’ diplomatic network (Bicchi and Maurer, 2018: 
11). The very presence of an EUD and of European diplomats’ meetings helps small member 
states to gain valuable information not obtainable otherwise, and provides contacts within a 
third country, thereby reducing the necessity for a local embassy with large staffing figures 
(Duquet, 2018).
Moreover, European diplomatic cooperation includes a material aspect, as one of the most 
relevant trends observed for facilitating diplomatic presence through the existence of EUDs is 
co-location. This occurs when diplomatic representations share premises and certain resources, 
in a variety of different arrangements. Bilaterally this has been practiced extensively by the 
Nordic countries (Rhinard et al., 2013: 43). In the EU context, EUDs have dramatically 
expanded the practice of hosting member states’ diplomatic representations. Since the advent 
of the EEAS and EUDs, this option has become available, with national embassies embedded 
within EUDs’ premises and occasionally sharing services (from security to air conditioning). 
While it seemed likely that this proposition would be more attractive for small member states’ 
with relatively limited diplomatic resources (Lequesne, 2015: 48–9), the key benefactors of 
this co-location practice have instead been large EU member states such as France and 
Germany, as Table 2 shows. Notably, two of the countries’ having reduced the size of their 
diplomatic network overall (Denmark and the Netherlands) have also made use of co-location. 
The EEAS itself has benefitted from this practice, with EUDs hosted on the premises of the 
UK’s embassy in Iraq and Sri Lanka, a matter to be revisited with Brexit. This trend is going 
to continue, as there are currently more co-location arrangements being negotiated.
12 The issue was resolved by creating a new ‘local’ administrative agency in Germany, devoted only to the 
Auswärtiges Amt, to examine some categories of visas (see Bartonek, 2020: 200).

































































Member state Country of co-location Total
France East Timor, Honduras, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, 
Paraguay, South Sudan*
6
Germany Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, South Sudan*, Tanzania* 4
Netherlands Chad, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Tanzania* 4
United Kingdom Chad, Mauritania, South Sudan*, Tanzania* 4
Denmark Bolivia, Somalia 2
Finland Somalia, Vietnam 2
Ireland Colombia, New Zealand 2
Spain Fiji, Myanmar 2
Sweden Burkina Faso, Somalia 2






Table 2: Embassy co-location with EUDs
Source: Internal EEAS document, February 2020. *Includes sharing of services.
Therefore, while member states did not reduce their diplomatic networks in response to the 
establishment of EUDs, they did cut their diplomats’ numbers while relying on EUDs for 
material services on the ground. Member states have continued to cherish and even expand 
their global reach beyond EU borders, to the point of doing so with limited human resources. 
Co-location is one way in which this was made possible. This is relevant, from the perspective 
of European cooperation, as co-location brings in close proximity diplomats from the EEAS 
and from national representations. In fact, given EUDs composite staffing, ‘European houses’ 
in co-location host officials with a whole variety of mandates and of opportunities to interact. 
Even if European representation was not directly strengthened by an exclusive diplomatic 
mandate to EUDs to represent member states, European cooperation might emerge stronger by 
fostering closer relations in a European environment.
6. Conclusions
This article has brought to evidence fresh data about European diplomatic networks, 
highlighting major transformations in the way in which the Europeans organise their diplomatic 
contacts, both within the EU and across the globe. These trends have identified a number of 
patterns, which are relevant to current debates. Two in particular stand out.
First, EU enlargement thickens the fabric of European diplomacy across the continent, as well 
as in Brussels, making the European continent diplomatically unique. EU’s enlargements since 
2004 have created new diplomatic representations across the European continent and even 
though this trend has partially faded, European diplomatic networks remain thick across the 
EU’s territory. Access to the EU club brings a higher level of diplomatic contacts, especially 
at the time of enlargement/accession but also after the initial period. Brussels is a key 
diplomatic site, to the point of ‘Brusselisation’ of third country representation in Europe. The 
quantity of diplomatic ties on the European continent and in Brussels thus underpins the unique 
quality of diplomatic cooperation across the EU. The challenge for future research thus 
becomes to identify how this thick diplomatic life relates to and complements contacts between 

































































officials from other national ministries. A possible way forward is through the analysis of 
specific sectors, such as ‘science diplomacy.’13
Second, diplomatic representations across the globe have maintained and even increased their 
relevance, despite an apparently shrinking pool of diplomats. While the creation of the EEAS 
in 2010 transformed the network of European Commission’s representation into EUDs and 
expanded their numbers to reach the level of France, Germany and the UK, this has not led to 
a reduction in member states’ diplomatic representations beyond EU borders. On the contrary, 
most member states have maintained and even partly expanded their diplomatic network, 
responding to political and economic concerns, albeit with a diminished pool of human 
resources. Member states’ constant attention to their diplomatic footprint speaks to the 
continued relevance of territorial representation. Having a diplomatic outpost on the ground, 
even if it might be held by a single person, clearly still brings advantages. The continued 
relevance of diplomatic outposts across the globe highlights a key field of analysis, which we 
have begun to address here with a focus on Austria, France, Germany and Italy, but deserves 
further research. In the cases explored, diplomatic representations’ numbers, as well as budget 
availability for specific instruments, have increased, but diplomats’ numbers have declined, 
with the partial exception of Germany. To put it differently, there has been an investment in 
structures and in projects, rather than human resources. 
Therefore, this picture suggests a scenario in which diplomacy is profoundly changing, in ways 
that counter expectations of diplomacy’s slide into irrelevance but take on board globalists’ 
attention to new forms of diplomatic engagement and further stress the role of European 
cooperation (and of the EEAS in particular). Diplomats representing member states and the EU 
are relying on a variety of technological means, which facilitate communication as well as 
forecasting and scenario planning. They are also embedded in vital forms of European 
cooperation that bring material and ideational benefits, from information sharing to voice 
amplification to reduced costs in handling diplomatic outposts. The Lisbon Treaty has opened 
the way to many forms of diplomatic cooperation under a single European roof, which are 
definitely worth analysing. But amid much change, one aspect is constant: European 
diplomacy’s reach and quality remains unmatched.
Bibliography
Adler-Nissen R (2014) Symbolic power in European diplomacy: the struggle between 
national foreign services and the EU’s External Action Service. Review of 
International Studies 40(04): 657–681. DOI: 10.1017/S0260210513000326.
Allen D (1998) ‘Who speaks for Europe?’ The search for an effective and coherent external 
policy. In: Peterson J and Sjursen H (eds) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?: 
Competing Visions of the CFSP. London: Routledge, pp. 44–60.
Austermann F (2014) European Union Delegations in EU Foreign Policy: A Diplomatic Service 
of Different Speeds. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
13 See e.g. the Forum on Science Diplomacy in The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol.15, n.3.

































































Balfour R, Carta C and Raik K (eds) (2015) The European External Action Service and National 
Foreign Ministries: Convergence or Divergence? Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate.
Baltag D and Smith M (2015) EU and Member State Diplomacies in Moldova and Ukraine: 
Examining EU Diplomatic Performance Post-Lisbon. European Integration online 
Papers 19. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2554452 (accessed 3 
December 2019).
Bartonek, E. (2020). Journeying into the Diplomatic Unknown: The Vergesellschaftung of the 
German Auswärtiges Amt. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 15(1-2), 196-205.
Bátora J (2005) Does the European Union transform the institution of diplomacy? Journal of 
European Public Policy 12(1): 44–66. DOI: 10.1080/1350176042000311907.
Bátora J and Hocking B (2009) EU-oriented bilateralism: evaluating the role of member state 
embassies in the European Union. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22(1): 
163–182. DOI: 10.1080/09557570802683938.
Bayer R (2006) Diplomatic Exchange Data set, v2006.1. Available at: 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/diplomatic-exchange.
Berridge G (2010) Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. 4th ed. Basingstoke: Palgave Macmillan.
Bicchi F (2014) Information exchanges, diplomatic networks and the construction of 
European knowledge in European Union foreign policy. Cooperation and Conflict 
49(2): 239–259. DOI: 10.1177/0010836713482871.
Bicchi F and Maurer H (2018) Introduction: European Cooperation Abroad: European 
Diplomatic Cooperation Outside EU Borders. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 13(1): 
1–19. DOI: 10.1163/1871191X-13010003.
Black J (2010) A History of Diplomacy. London: Reaktion.
BMEIA (2010) Außenpolitischer Bericht 2009. Vienna: Bundesministerium für europäische 
und internationale Angelegenheiten.
BMEIA (2019) Außen- und Europapolitischer Bericht 2018. Vienna: Bundesministerium für 
Europa, Integration und Äußeres.
Bratberg Ø (2008) Bilateral Embassies in an Integrated Europe: a Case of Institutional 
Robustness? Journal of European Integration 30(2): 235–253. DOI: 
10.1080/07036330802005441.
Brockmeier S (2018) Making the German Foreign Office Fit for Berlin’s New Role in the 
World. March. Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute. Available at: 
https://www.gppi.net/2018/03/28/making-the-german-foreign-office-fit-for-berlins-
new-role-in-the-world.

































































Brössler D (2019) Personalmangel im Auswärtigen Amt. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 7 June. 
München. Available at: https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/diplomatie-
auswaertiges-amt-1.4477442 (accessed 24 February 2020).
Bundesregierung (2006) Antwort auf die Kleine Anfrage ‘Personalsituation im Auswärtigen 
Amt für den Aufbruch in die Diplomatie des 21. Jahrhunderts’. 16/2298, July. Berlin: 
Deutscher Bundestag.
Bundesregierung (2018) Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage 
‘Personalreserve für den Auswärtigen Dienst’. 19/2022, May. Berlin: Deutscher 
Bundestag.
Bundesregierung (2019) Bundeshaushaltsplan 2019 Einzelplan 05 Auswärtiges Amt. Berlin: 
Bundesregierung.
Commission des Affaires Étrangères (2019) Rapport d’information sur l’audit et le contrôle 
des processus de gestion de postes diplomatiques. 2408. Paris: Assemblée nationale.
Cooper AF and Cornut J (2019) The changing practices of frontline diplomacy: New 
directions for inquiry. Review of International Studies 45(2): 300–319. DOI: 
10.1017/S0260210518000505.
Cooper AF, Heine J and Thakur RC (eds) (2015) The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy. 
Oxford: OUP.
Copeland D (2015) Digital Technology. In: Cooper AF, Heine J, and Thakur RC (eds) The 
Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy. Oxford: OUP, pp. 453–472.
Cornut J and Dale N (2019) Historical, Practical, and Theoretical Perspectives on the 
Digitalisation of Diplomacy: An Exploratory Analysis. Diplomacy & Statecraft 30(4): 
829–836. DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2019.1673559.
Costa O (2019) The politicization of EU external relations. Journal of European Public Policy 
26(5). Routledge: 790–802. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2018.1478878.
Cross M (2007) The European Diplomatic Corps: Diplomats and International Cooperation 
from Westphalia to Maastricht. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Duquet S (2018) Bound or Unbridled? A Legal Perspective on the Diplomatic Functions of 
European Union Delegations. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 13(1): 21–40. DOI: 
10.1163/1871191X-13010030.
Duquet S and Wouters J (2015) Unus inter plures? The EEAS, the Vienna Convention and 
International Diplomatic Practice. In: Spence D and Bátora J (eds) The European 
External Action Service: European Diplomacy Post-Westphalia. Houndmills, 
Basingstoke: Palgave Macmillan, pp. 159–174.
Edwards G (2014) The Public Face of a Proto-Something ….: Diplomacy and the European 
Union. Diplomacy & Statecraft 25(1): 115–134. DOI: 
10.1080/09592296.2014.873614.

































































Goff PM (2015) Public diplomacy at the global level: The Alliance of Civilizations as a 
community of practice. Cooperation and Conflict 50(3): 402–417. DOI: 
10.1177/0010836715574915.
Hadfield A, Manners I and Whitman RG (eds) (2017) Foreign Policies of EU Member States: 
Continuity and Europeanisation. Abingdon: Routledge.
Hall I (2010) The transformation of diplomacy: mysteries, insurgencies and public relations. 
International Affairs 86(1): 247–256. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00878.x.
Hamilton K and Langhorne R (2011) The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory, 
Administration. 2nd ed. Abingdon: Routledge.
Hofius M (2016) Community at the border or the boundaries of community? The case of EU 
field diplomats. Review of International Studies 42(5): 939–967. DOI: 
10.1017/S0260210516000085.
Juncos AE and Pomorska K (2011) Invisible and unaccountable? National Representatives 
and Council Officials in EU foreign policy. Journal of European Public Policy 18(8). 
Routledge: 1096–1114. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2011.615197.
Kessler M-C and Charillon F (2018) Les moyens à la disposition des ambassadeurs. In: Vaïsse 
M (ed.) Diplomatie Française: Outils et Acteurs Depuis 1980. Paris: Odile Jacob, pp. 
265–271.
Koops JA and Macaj G (eds) (2015) The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Kuus M (2015) Symbolic power in diplomatic practice: Matters of style in Brussels. 
Cooperation and Conflict. DOI: 10.1177/0010836715574914.
Lequesne C (2015) At the Centre of Coordination: Staff, Resources and Procedures in the 
European External Action Service and in the Delegations. In: Balfour R, Carta C, and 
Raik K (eds) The European External Action Service and National Foreign Ministries: 
Convergence or Divergence? Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 45–54.
Lowy Institute (2019) Lowy Global Diplomacy Index. Sydney: Lowy Institute. Available at: 
https://globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org/ (accessed 3 December 2019).
MAECI (2015) Annuario statistico 2015. Rome: Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della 
Cooperazione Internazionale.
MAECI (2018) Annuario statistico 2018. Rome: Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della 
Cooperazione Internazionale.
Maier CS (2000) Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the 
Modern Era. The American Historical Review 105(3): 807–831. DOI: 
10.2307/2651811.

































































Malone, DM (2013). The modern diplomatic mission. In: Cooper AF, Heine J and Thakur R 
(eds)  The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy. Oxford: OUP
Manners I and Whitman R (2000) The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States. 
Manchester University Press.
Mattelaer M (2019). The resurgence of bilateral diplomacy in Europe. Egmont Paper 104 
Brussels: Egmont.
Maurer H (2016) Austrian diplomacy in a changing global and European context: Between 
innovation, adaptation and resilience. Österreichische Zeitschrift für 
Politikwissenschaft 45(2). 2: 35–47. DOI: 10.15203/ozp.1116.vol45iss2.
Maurer H and Raik K (2018) Neither Fish nor Fowl. How EU Delegations Challenge the 
Institution of Diplomacy: The Cases of Moscow and Washington. The Hague Journal 
of Diplomacy 13(1): 57–74. DOI: 10.1163/15685373-13010034.
Missiroli A (2010) The New EU ‘Foreign Policy’ System after Lisbon: A Work in Progress. 
European Foreign Affairs Review 15(4): 427–452.
Morisse-Schillbach M (2005) France. In: Hocking B and Spence D (eds) Foreign Ministries in 
the European Union: Integrating Diplomats. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 111–131.
Murray S, Sharp P, Wiseman G, et al. (2011) The Present and Future of Diplomacy and 
Diplomatic Studies. International Studies Review 13(4). Wiley: 709–728.
Neumann IB (2016) Sited Diplomacy. In: Dittmer J and McConnell F (eds) Diplomatic Cultures 
and International Politics. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 79–92.
Oliver A (2016) The Irrelevant Diplomat: Do We Need Embassies Anymore? Foreign Affairs, 
14 March. New York, NY. Available at: 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2016-03-14/irrelevant-diplomat.
Paschke KT (2005) Die Zukunft der deutschen Botschaften in der EU. In: Brandt E and Buck C 
(eds) Auswärtiges Amt: Diplomatie Als Beruf. Wiesbaden: Springer, pp. 333–339.
Pouliot V (2016) International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral 
Diplomacy. Cambridge: CUP.
Pouliot V and Cornut J (2015) Practice theory and the study of diplomacy: A research 
agenda. Cooperation and Conflict 50(3): 297–315. DOI: 10.1177/0010836715574913.
Regelsberger E (2005) Germany. In: Hocking B and Spence D (eds) Foreign Ministries in the 
European Union: Integrating Diplomats. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 132–145.
Rhinard M, Lewander J and Norrevik S (2013) Sweden and the European External Action 
Service. In: Balfour R and Raik K (eds) The European External Action Service and 
National Diplomacies. EPC Issue Paper 73. Brussels: European Policy Centre, pp. 35–
44.

































































Rijks D and Whitman R (2007) European diplomatic representation in third countries: trends 
and options. In: The EU Foreign Service: How to Build a More Effective Common 
Policy. Brussels: European Policy Centre, pp. 35–47.
Saint-Geours Y and Kessler M-C (2018) Les ressources humaines. In: Vaïsse M (ed.) 
Diplomatie Française: Outils et Acteurs Depuis 1980. Paris: Odile Jacob, pp. 279–288.
Schade D (2019) Lateinamerikapolitik. In: Jahrbuch Der Europäischen Integration 2019. 
Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 339–342.
Scott-Smith G (2017) Introduction. New Global Studies 11(2): 77–84. DOI: 10.1515/ngs-
2017-0013.
Semo M (2018) Le Quai d’Orsay réduit sa masse salariale et redéploie ses aides. Le Monde. 
30 August. Paris. Available at: 
https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2018/08/30/le-quai-d-orsay-reduit-
sa-masse-salariale-et-redeploie-ses-aides_5348042_3210.html.
Sharp P (2011) Diplomats, Diplomacy, Diplomatic Studies, and the Future of International 
Relations and International Studies. International Studies Review 13(4): 716–19.
Smith M (2013) Foreign policy and d velopment in the post-Lisbon European Union. 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 26(3): 519–535. DOI: 
10.1080/09557571.2013.816838.
Smith M, Keukeleire S and Vanhoonacker S (eds) (2016) The Diplomatic System of the 
European Union: Evolution, Change and Challenges. Abingdon: Routledge. Available 
at: https://www-1taylorfrancis-1com-1ssnxtmiy005d.hanserver.suub.uni-
bremen.de/books/e/9781317536642 (accessed 1 April 2019).
Smith MH (2018) Does the Flag Still Follow Trade? Agency, Politicization and External 
Opportunity Structures in the Post-Lisbon System of EU Diplomacy. The Hague 
Journal of Diplomacy 13(1): 41–56. DOI: 10.1163/1871191X-13010011.
Sofer S (1988) Old and New Diplomacy: A Debate Revisited. Review of International Studies 
14(3): 195–211.
Sonnleitner S (2018) Bilateral Diplomacy and EU Membership: Case Study on Austria. Baden-
Baden: Nomos.
Spence D and Bátora J (eds) (2015) The European External Action Service: European 
Diplomacy Post-Westphalia. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgave Macmillan.
Thomas DC and Tonra B (2012) To What Ends EU Foreign Policy? Contending Approaches to 
the Union’s Diplomatic Objectives and Representation. The Hague Journal of 
Diplomacy 7(1): 11–29. DOI: 10.1163/187119112X609176.
Uilenreef A (2014) Alternatives to the Resident Embassy: Intra-EU Diplomatic Networks in 
the Twenty-first Century. Diplomacy & Statecraft 25(2): 356–377. DOI: 
10.1080/09592296.2014.907074.

































































Vaïsse M (2018) Introduction générale: Une période de réformes incessantes (des années 
1970 à 2018). In: Vaïsse M (ed.) Diplomatie Française: Outils et Acteurs Depuis 1980. 
Paris: Odile Jacob, pp. 27–42.










































































































































































Chart 1: Representation of EU-28 countries in EU-28 member states over time
Source: Diplometrics Diplomatic Representation dataset, Europa World Factbook











































































































































































Chart 2: Representation in non-EU-28 countries of EU-28 member states over time;
2001 EU data relates to European Commission representative offices
Source: Own dataset, with additions from Diplometrics Diplomatic Representation dataset, Europa World Factbook.

































































Map 1: Size of the EU’s diplomatic network by partner country in 2018 (maximum 28 member states + EUD)
Source: Own dataset

































































Map 2: Change in the EU’s diplomatic network by partner country between 2009 and 2018 (EU28 + EUD)
Source: Own dataset
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